

Front Edit Other
Page Page Page

Date:

from the **GLOBE'S Bureaus****Washington**By Edward W.
O'Brien

WASHINGTON.—Way back on March 2 of last year, President Kennedy said some things about nuclear testing that sound startling today.

"Until we measure the effects of actual explosions in the atmosphere under realistic conditions," the President declared, "we will not know precisely how to prepare our future defenses, how best to equip our missiles for penetration of an anti-missile system, and whether it is possible to achieve such a system for ourselves."

He was really saying that the United States could be committing suicide if it agrees to a nuclear test ban with the Russians before we know a great deal more about what we're doing.

If there is any doubt about his meaning, another part of his 1962 statement should eliminate the confusion. The President also said that until the necessary testing is completed, we cannot be certain how much of our preparation in the field of nuclear weapons "will turn out to be useless—blacked out, paralyzed, or destroyed by the complex effects of a nuclear explosion."

If our nuclear weapons don't work, we have no defense, and we had all better start learning Russian right now.

★ ★ ★

Since March 2, 1962, President Kennedy and much of his Administration have pressed harder than ever for a nuclear deal with the Russians. Many Senators have taken up the same cause, and a tremendous propaganda campaign has developed outside the government.

Yet, the somber questions raised by Mr. Kennedy himself have not been answered, even in the government's innermost councils. The information to answer them is not in existence because evaluation of the tests to which the President referred has not been completed.

The United States, then, has been laboring in

a cloud of ignorance while it negotiates its future with the Soviet.

Many Senators have been pleading with the Administration to slow down, to determine where it's going before it gets there. Since no one else in the government has taken on the job, the Senate Preparedness Subcommittee since September has been conducting hearings in private to obtain the answers, so that intelligent judgments could be made.

The Subcommittee Chairman, Senator John C. Stennis (Dem.), Mississippi, warned his colleagues a few days ago of the burden they bear in behalf of almost 200 million other Americans.

"In this crucial area, upon which the very survival of our country might depend, we must be certain, not only beyond all reasonable doubt, but to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis of a doubt," Senator Stennis said.

★ ★ ★

The subcommittee won't reach any conclusions for many weeks. But hints of the dismal tone of the evidence have come already from two members who are not noted for speaking casually.

Both Chairman Stennis and Missouri's Senator Stuart Symington declared they are "disturbed" by what the Subcommittee has heard from Administration officials—from the experts in the State Department, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Department of Defense, the Air Force, and Central Intelligence Agency.

These witnesses informed the Subcommittee, in Senator Stennis' cautious phrase, of "the possibilities—even in some cases the probabilities—as to what would be our situation should we be caught short." One way of being caught short, the Senators said, would be if the United States embarks on another unpoliced 34-month test moratorium, as it did under President Eisenhower, while the Russians continue to test in secret.

During a brief debate, an ardent advocate of a test ban deal, Minnesota's Senator Hubert Humphrey, said he realizes "there are differences of opinion" on the test ban question.

He was corrected by Senator Symington. There may or may not be differences of opinion. No one can really say because before there are "opinions" there should be facts. And on the whole emotion-laden issue, the element most lacking is the simple one of knowledge.



Mr. O'Brien

Key: 1. usarm
x Ag 3-3-1
x Pres 2 John STENNIS
x Pres 2 Stuart SYMINGTON
x Sci 5

MAY 28 1963

Approved For Release 2005/01/05 : CIA-RDP75-00149R000700440004-6

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE

9229

1963

LIAMS. It will also mean sending Democrats to the House of Representatives.

In 1964 the issues will be on our side. Our side will also have the candidates. But this, alone, is not enough. You—the members upon whom our Party depends—must make sure that in addition to the issues and the candidates, we have the organization, the teamwork and the popular voice with which we can win.

We depend on you—the young members of a youthful Party to carry the message of the Democratic program to the people of New Jersey. For the future at which our program aims is your future and that of your children. And the America which we wish to see in that future can only be as strong as our efforts of today.

One fact we know—our candidate for the Presidency has already shown his metal, already proved his calibre, already given us the start we need.

This man—John Fitzgerald Kennedy—will lead the way.

PROPOSED BAN ON ATMOSPHERIC AND UNDERWATER NUCLEAR TESTING

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I have read with a great deal of interest Senate Resolution 148 which was introduced in the Senate by the distinguished Senator from Connecticut (Mr. Donnell) and others on May 27. This resolution proposes that the Senate go on record as supporting a renewed U.S. offer to the Soviet Union of an agreement banning all tests that contaminate the atmosphere or the oceans and that, in the event of the rejection of such offer, we commit ourselves unilaterally to a moratorium on such testing.

I recognize that it is the objective of the resolution to bring to bear upon the negotiations in Geneva the prestige and influence of the U.S. Senate. In the hope that these so far futile talks might finally succeed in achieving at least one small, faltering step in the direction of slowing the arms race.

I am sympathetic with the objectives which the Senator from Connecticut has in mind. I am not one of those who would oppose any test ban agreement at all times and under all circumstances. I am one, however, who insists that any such agreement be ironclad and be fully adequate to protect our security, safety and survival. In this crucial area—upon which the very survival of our country might depend—we must be certain, not only beyond all reasonable doubt, but to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis of a doubt.

Therefore, as much as I sympathize with the objectives of the Senator from Connecticut and those of my colleagues who joined him in sponsoring the resolution, I must give expression to my conviction that we cannot afford to act in this vital field until we are in full possession of all facts which bear on the question of whether any cessation of atmospheric nuclear testing by us—whether unilaterally or as the result of an agreement—is truly in the national self-interest.

I think that we will all agree that in the past it has been necessary for us to conduct nuclear tests, despite any hazards and disadvantage that might ac-

company them, for the purpose of insuring that this Nation had at its disposal the means to insure our survival. From atmospheric testing have come all of our major nuclear weapons developments and our knowledge of the means to employ them most effectively in the defense of our country if it should become necessary. For my part I would support an atmospheric nuclear test ban only if I was entirely convinced that there is absolutely no relationship between continued testing by this country and the ability of our retaliatory or second strike forces to survive a surprise nuclear attack.

I am sure that we would all agree that a nuclear test ban would not be in the national interest if we were at a substantial qualitative disadvantage to the Soviets in the field of the development of nuclear weapons. While I do not believe that such a qualitative disadvantage exists it is clear that, if it did exist, a cessation of testing by us might be a prelude to national suicide. It is clear that we need hard and cold facts in this area.

We also need hard and cold facts in the area of nuclear effects, in determining what effect an enemy's nuclear explosions would have upon our ability to survive and respond. If there are real, tangible, and substantial doubts and unresolved questions in this field which cannot be resolved without further atmospheric testing, then, as President Kennedy said on March 2, 1962, "until we measure the effects of actual explosions in the atmosphere under realistic conditions, we will not know precisely how to prepare our future defenses, how best to equip our missiles for penetration of an antimissile system, and whether it is possible to achieve such a system for ourselves."

These are some of the questions which must be asked and answered before the necessary unqualified assurance in this field can be acquired:

Are atmospheric nuclear tests required to provide our Nation with an effective defense against Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles?

Are atmospheric nuclear tests required to provide our Nation with a certain capability to penetrate a Soviet missile defense employing nuclear warheads?

Are atmospheric nuclear tests required to assure the immunity of our second strike missile systems to a surprise enemy nuclear attack?

Are atmospheric nuclear tests required to develop specialized nuclear warheads to defend our Nation against satellite bombs and other terror weapons with which the free world has been threatened?

President Kennedy in his statement of March 2, 1962, said that, until we have the necessary testing, we cannot be certain how much of our preparation in the field of nuclear weapons "will turn out to be useless: blacked out, paralyzed, or destroyed by the complex effects of a nuclear explosion." Nothing less than certainty in this area will suffice.

That statement was made by the President some time ago, but I am reliably informed that we have not yet completed an evaluation of the tests to which he

referred at that time. That evaluation is still in progress and has not been completed and its effect fully determined.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. STENNIS. I am glad to yield to the Senator from Missouri, who has very extensive knowledge of this complex problem, as well as a very keen interest therein.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I congratulate the able Senator from Mississippi for bringing to the attention of the Senate the fact that he, with great preparation and care, is attempting to obtain the facts with respect to this all-important subject. The future of the United States and the free world could possibly depend upon decisions made in this field.

Has the Senator not been disturbed by some of the detailed technical information which has been presented to the subcommittee in the many days and weeks of hearings by the experts in their particular fields with respect to what could happen to certain aspects of our defense structure if the Soviets were to continue tests in secret and at the same time this country should decide to enter into another moratorium comparable to the 34-month moratorium between 1958 and 1961.

Mr. STENNIS. Based upon the sincere testimony taken under oath, which we have heard from competent witnesses, I am greatly disturbed by the things we have learned with reference to the possibilities—even in some cases probabilities—as to what would be our situation should we be caught short, so to speak. The Senator from Mississippi believes that there must be a thorough consideration of these questions immediately. I believe that a more thorough consideration will bring out the certainties and uncertainties, so that a real evaluation can be made.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I believe that the Senator from Mississippi is performing a great service this evening in making these observations, in his typically quiet and thorough manner.

Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator. Unfortunately, most of the testimony that we have received is of the highest security nature, and cannot be published now.

I do nothing more than state the simple truth when I say that the U.S. Senate does not now have full, complete, and unequivocal answers to these fundamental questions. It is easy to ask them; it is difficult to acquire the answers. I, for one, am convinced that the answers must be forthcoming before the Senate commits itself to any course of action, or to any recommendation, on a matter which bears so directly on our ability to survive.

It was for the purpose of acquiring the answers to these and similar questions that the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, of which I am privileged to be chairman, last September commenced hearings on our nuclear test ban proposals, one of which was substantially identical to the agreement proposed by Senate Resolution 148. This was rejected out of hand by the Soviets.